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Abstract
This paper investigates the dimension requirements of informationally decentralized Pareto-
satisfactory processes in production economies with increasing returns to scale or more gen-
eral types of non-convexities. We show that the marginal cost pricing (MCP) mechanism is
informationally efficient over the class of non-convex production economies where MCP equi-
librium allocations are Pareto efficient. We then discuss the informational requirements of
realizing Pareto efficient allocations for a general class of non-convex production economies.
We do so by examining the dimension of the message space of the marginal cost pricing
mechanism with transfers. Since the set of marginal cost pricing equilibrium allocations
with transfers contains Pareto efficient allocations as a subset for every economy under con-
sideration, Pareto efficient allocations can be realized through the MCP mechanism with
transfers, which is informationally decentralized and has a finite-dimensional message space.
This result is sharply contrasted to the impossibility result given in Calsamigla (1977).
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
This paper studies the informational requirements of resource allocation mechanisms that select
Pareto optimal allocations for economies with increasing returns to scale or more general types of
non-convexities. The importance of this research is motivated from the following three aspects:
(1) the failure of the competitive model and Walrasian equilibrium principle in the presence
of increasing returns , (2) regulation and pricing in some sectors (typically in public sector)
that usually are connected with imperfect competition, and (3) increasing returns to knowledge
creation are used to model long-term economic growth evidenced in the so-called “new economy”
and studied in the endogenous growth theory.
Non-convexities in production, which can often arise from technical progress, imperfection
of markets, fixed costs, increasing returns to scale, or indivisibilities, have their practical impor-
tance. The non-convex firms can be thought of as privately owned public utilities, which are
regulated (cf. Brown and Heal, 1983, 1985). This type of market structure is common in the
United States, and various pricing rules such as marginal cost, average cost, loss-free, voluntary
trading, and quantity-taking pricing rules have been proposed in the literature. Since public
utilities are privately owned, any pricing rule imposed by a regulator should be informationally
decentralized. Also, beginning in the mid-1980s, Paul Romer (1986) formalized the relationship
between the economics of ideas and long term economic growth. According to Romer, an inher-
ent characteristic of ideas is that they are non-rivalry. If ideas are non-rival, then the economy
faces increasing returns to scale; implying there is imperfect competition. This is evidenced by
the present “new economy”. Increasing returns to scale in aggregation are common features
in some sectors such as high-tech or biotech industries due to market imperfection or technical
progress, and they are the main sources of long-term economic growth. Study of this relationship
results in the “new growth theory” (cf. Romer, 1986; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; and Jones,
2002).
A formal study of the informational requirements and informational optimality of resource
allocation processes was initiated by Hurwicz (1960). The interest in such a study was greatly
stimulated by the “socialist controversy” — the debate over the feasibility of central planning
between Mises-Hayek and Lange-Lerner (von Hayek, 1935, 1945; Lange, 1936-7, 1944; Lerner,
1944). In the Mises-Hayek-Lange-Lerner debate, the marginal cost pricing doctrine was proposed
in response to Mises-Hayek’s criticism of a socialist system’s information problem, a centrally
planned system has to use immense information (infinite dimension of message space) to make
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production decisions. In line with the prevailing tradition, interest in this area was focused
on the design of Pareto-satisfactory (non-wasteful) and privacy-preserving mechanisms, i.e.,
mechanisms that result in Pareto efficient allocations and use informationally decentralized
decision making processes. Allocative efficiency and informational efficiency are two highly
desired properties for an economic system to have. The importance of Pareto optimality is
attributed to what may be regarded as a minimal welfare property. Pareto optimality requires
resources be allocated efficiently. If an allocation is not efficient, there is a waste in allocating
resources and thus at least one agent is better off without making others worse off under given
resources. Informational efficiency requires an economic system have the minimal informational
cost of operation. The informational requirements depend upon two basic components: the class
and types of economic environments over which a mechanism is supposed to operate and the
particular outcomes that a mechanism is required to realize.
A mechanism can be viewed as an abstract planning procedure; it consists of a message
space in which communication takes place, rules by which the agents form messages, and an
outcome function which translates messages into outcomes (allocations of resources). Mecha-
nisms are imagined to operate iteratively. Attention, however, may be focused on mechanisms
that have stationary or equilibrium messages for each possible economic environment. A mecha-
nism realizes a prespecified welfare criterion (also called performance, social choice rule, or social
choice correspondence) if the outcomes given by the outcome function agree with the welfare
criterion of the stationary messages. The realization theory studies the question of how much
communication must be provided to realize a given performance, or more precisely, the minimal
informational cost of operating a given performance in terms of the size of the message space.
It determines which economic system or social choice rule is informationally the most efficient
in the sense that the minimal informational cost is used to operate the system.
1.2 Related Literature
Since the pioneering work of Hurwicz (1960), there has been a lot of work on studying the
informational requirements of decentralized resource allocation mechanisms over various classes
of economies such as those in Hurwicz (1972, 1977, 1999), Mount and Reiter (1974), Calsamiglia
(1977), Walker (1977), Sato (1981), Calsamiglia and Kirman (1993), Tian (1990, 1994, 2003,
2004, 2006), Ishikida and Marschak (1996) among others.
One of the well-known results in this literature establishes the minimal usage of information
in the competitive (Walrasian) mechanism for pure exchange economies. Hurwicz (1972, 1986),
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Mount and Reiter (1974), Walker (1977) among others proved that, for pure exchange private
goods economies, the competitive allocation process is the most informationally efficient process.
Any smooth, informationally decentralized allocation mechanism which achieves Pareto optimal
allocations must use information at least as large as the competitive mechanism.1 Thus, the
competitive allocation process has a message space of minimal dimension among a certain class
of resource allocation processes that are privacy-preserving and non-wasteful. For brevity, this
result has been referred to as the Efficiency Theorem. Jordan (1982) further proved that the
competitive allocation process is uniquely informationally efficient among mechanisms that real-
ize Pareto efficient and individually rational allocations. Calsamiglia and Kirman (1993) proved
the equal income Walrasian mechanism is uniquely informationally efficient among all resource
allocation mechanisms that realize fair allocations. The work of these researches provides the
Uniqueness Theorem for pure exchange economies. Recently, Tian (2006) further proved the
informational optimality and uniqueness of the competitive mechanism in using information ef-
ficiently for convex private ownership production economies. These efficiency and uniqueness
results are of fundamental importance from the view point of political economy. They show the
uniqueness of the competitive market mechanism in terms of allocative efficiency and informa-
tional efficiency, provided the economies have only convex production sets.
Although there is great appeal to the presence of non-convexities in production, most work
mentioned above only considers the issue of informational requirements of a decentralized re-
source allocation mechanism for pure exchange economies or economies with convex production
possibility sets. The only exception was Calsamiglia (1977) who considered the economic en-
vironments with increasing returns. However, his result is an impossibility result. He showed
that in production economies with unbounded increasing returns to scale there exists no smooth
privacy-preserving and non-wasteful process that uses a finite-dimensional message space. Be-
cause of this impossibility result, economists generally believe that there is no hope to have
a smooth privacy-preserving and non-wasteful process that uses a finite-dimensional message
space.
1.3 The Results of the Paper
The purpose of this paper is to show that Calsamiglia’s result is too pessimistic. To do so,
we first establish a lower bound of information, as measured by the size of the message space,
1A mechanism is called smooth if the stationary message correspondence is either locally threaded or if the
inverse of the stationary message correspondence has a Lipschizian-continuous selection in a subset. This termi-
nology was used by Hurwicz (1999). We will give the definition of the local threadedness below.
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that is required to guarantee an informationally decentralized mechanism that realizes Pareto
efficient allocations over the class of economies that include non-convex production technologies.
We show that any informationally decentralized smooth mechanism that realizes Pareto efficient
allocations over the class of production economies has a message space of dimension no smaller
than (L−1)I+LJ , where I is the number of consumers, J is the number of producers, and L is
the number of commodities. We then establish the informational optimality of the marginal cost
pricing (MCP) mechanism over the class of non-convex production economies where all MCP
equilibrium allocations are Pareto efficient. We show that the lower bound is exactly the size of
the message space of the MCP mechanism, and thus any smooth informationally decentralized
mechanism that realizes Pareto efficient allocations has a message space whose topological size
is greater than or equal to that of the MCP mechanism. Thus, the MCP mechanism is an
informationally efficient process among privacy-preserving and non-wasteful resource allocation
mechanisms over the class of non-convex production economies where every MCP equilibrium
allocation is Pareto efficient.
We then study the informational requirements for realizing Pareto efficient allocations for a
general class of non-convex production economies. We establish our possibility result that Pareto
efficient allocations can be realized by an informationally decentralized mechanism with a finite-
dimensional message space for the general class of non-convex production economies. Since
Pareto efficient allocations can be characterized by marginal cost pricing equilibrium allocations
with transfers (MCPT), the positive results are obtained by examining the upper bound of
the message space of the MCPT allocation mechanism, defined in the paper, that is privacy-
preserving and then obtain the upper bound of the message space of the MCPT mechanism
which has finite dimension L(I+J) for general non-convex production economies. Thus, in sharp
contrast to Calsamigla (1977), we show that it is possible to have a non-wasteful informationally
decentralized mechanism that has a finite-dimensional message space.
What leads us to obtain such a different result? As it will be seen, the local threadedness
on the entailed class of economic environments is probably an unduly strong requirement to
impose on processes defined over classes of economies displaying production non-convexities.
Calsamiglia’s impossibility theorem is based on the condition that the message correspondence is
locally threaded for every economy under consideration. In our opinion, to exclude the possibility
of smuggling information arbitrarily, it is enough only to assume the message correspondence is
locally threaded for some economy as assumed such as those in Calsamiglia and Kirman (1993)
and Tian (1990, 1994, 2003, 2004, 2006), but not assume that it is locally threaded for every
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economy since the marginal cost pricing process is not locally threaded for all economies under
consideration.2 Thus, our possibility result is not only positive, but also more reasonable and
realistic.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give a basic setting
for the framework used in the paper. We specify economic environments with non-convex pro-
duction economies, and provide notation and definitions on resource allocation, the MCP, the
MCPT, social choice correspondence, outcome function, allocation mechanism, etc. Section
3 establishes a lower bound of the size of the message space which is required to guarantee
that an informationally decentralized mechanism realizes Pareto efficient allocations for a class
of non-convex production economies. Section 4 gives an Efficiency Theorem on the allocative
and informational efficiency for the MCP mechanism for the class of non-convex production
economies in which all MCP equilibrium allocations are Pareto efficient. Section 5 investigates
informational requirements for realizing Pareto efficient allocations for the general class of non-
convex production economies by examining the dimension of the message space of the MCPT
mechanism. Concluding remarks are presented in section 6. The proofs of Lemmas are in the
Appendix.
2 The Setup
In this section we give notation, definitions, and provide the basic settings needed in the paper.
2.1 Economic Environments
Consider production economies with L private goods, I consumers (characterized by their con-
sumption sets, preferences, and endowments), and J firms (characterized by their production
sets). Throughout this paper, subscripts are used to index consumers or firms, and superscripts
are used to index goods unless otherwise stated. By an agent, we will mean either a consumer
or a producer, thus there are N := I + J = 2 agents.3 Characteristics of agents are unknown
to the designer. For the ith consumer, his characteristic is denoted by ei = (Xi, wi,<i), where
Xi ⊂ RL is his consumption set, wi is his initial endowment vector, and <i is his preference
ordering that is assumed to be convex4, continuous on Xi, and strictly monotone on the set of
2It is easily seen that the competitive process is not locally threaded for all economic environments.
3As usual, vector inequalities, =, ≥, and >, are defined as follows: Let a, b ∈ Rm. Then a = b means as = bs
for all s = 1, . . . ,m; a ≥ b means a = b but a 6= b; a > b means as > bs for all s = 1, . . . ,m.
4<i is convex if for bundles a, b, c with 0 < λ 5 1 and c = λa+ (1− λ)b, the relation a Âi b implies c Âi b.
Note that the term “convex” is defined as in Debreu (1959), not as in some recent textbooks.
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interior points of Xi. Let Âi be the strict preference (asymmetric part) of <i.
For producer j, her characteristic is denoted by ej = (Yj) where Yj ⊂ RL is her production
possibility set. We assume that, for j = I + 1, . . . , N , Yj is nonempty, closed, contains 0
(possibility of inaction), and Yj − RL+ ⊆ Yj (free-disposal). Note that we do not assume that
Yj is convex so that production technologies may exhibit increasing returns to scale. It is also
important to note that, under these assumptions, ∂Yj , the boundary of the production set Yj ,
is exactly the set of (weakly) efficient production plans of the jth producer, that is,
∂Yj = {yj ∈ Yj :6 ∃y′j ∈ Yj , y′j > yj}.
We assume that there are no externalities or public goods. An economy is the full vector
e = (e1, . . . , eI , eI+1, . . . , eN ) and the set of all such production economies is denoted by E which
is assumed to be endowed with the product topology.
Let xi denote the consumption vector of consumer i and let zi = xi − wi denote the net
increment in commodity holdings (net trade vector). Let x = (x1, . . . , xI) and z = (z1, . . . , zI)
denote respectively the I-tuples of consumption and net trades. xi or zi is said to be individually
feasible if xi = zi + wi ∈ Xi. Similarly, let yj denote producer j’s (net) output vector that has
positive components for outputs and negative ones for inputs, and yi is said to be individually
feasible if yj ∈ Yj . Denote by y = (yI+1, . . . , yN ).
An allocation of the economy e is a vector (z, y) ∈ RNL. It is said to be balanced if∑Ii=1 zi =∑N
j=I+1 yj , and is said to be feasible if it is balanced and individually feasible for every individual.
Denote by A = {(z, y) ∈ RL(I+J) : zi + wi ∈ Xi, yj ∈ Yj ,
∑I
i=1 zi =
∑N
j=I+1 yj} the set of all
such feasible allocations.
An allocation (z, y) is said to be Pareto efficient if the following two conditions are satisfied:
(i) it is feasible;
(ii) there does not exist another feasible allocation (z′, y′) such that (z′i + wi) <i
(zi + wi) for all i = 1, . . . , I and (z′i + wi) Âi (zi + wi) for some i = 1, . . . , I.
Denote by P (e) the set of all such allocations.
2.2 Marginal Cost Pricing Equilibrium
It is generally recognized that the standard behavioral assumption of profit maximization is
non-applicable in the presence of increasing returns to scale, and thus one needs to adopt al-
ternative rules of firms’ behavior which cover not only convex production economies, but also
non-convex production economies. The marginal cost pricing equilibrium principle is such an
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alternative equilibrium principle. It is a natural generalization of the Walrasian equilibrium
principle to extend to economies involving non-convex production technologies. An advantage
of using the MCP principle is that unlike the other pricing rules, such as loss-free, average cost,
or voluntary-trading pricing equilibrium principle, a MCP equilibrium may result in a Pareto
efficient allocation for a certain class of non-convex economies. This may be why the MCP
doctrine is the earliest pricing rule proposed in the literature for general production economies
involving increasing returns to scale.
To define marginal cost pricing equilibrium for non-convex economies, we first give the notion
of the Clarke tangent and normal cones. The Clarke tangent normal cone to Y is a generalization
of the notion of the marginal rate of transformation in the absence of smoothness and convexity
assumptions (cf. Clarke (1975)). The formal definition of the Clarke normal cone requires the
notion of the Clarke tangent cone. For a non-empty set Y ⊆ RL and y ∈ Y , the tangent cone
of Y is given by TY (y) = {x ∈ RL: for every sequence yk ∈ Y with yk → y and every sequence
tk ∈ (0,∞) with tk → 0, there exists a sequence xk ∈ RL with xk → x such that yk + tkxk ∈ Y
for all k }. The Clarke normal cone is then given by NY (y) = {x ∈ RL : (z, x) 5 0 ∀z ∈ TY (y)}.
The important properties of the Clarke normal cone are: (1) it coincides with the standard
normal cone when Y is convex or when the boundary of Y is differentiable; (2) it is convex
and never reduces to the null vector for any boundary point of Y , and (3) the correspondence
y → NY (y) has a closed graph. These properties are well adapted to economic problem of
optimization and fixed points (cf. Cornet (1990), Quinzii (1992)).
For the marginal cost pricing rule, one usually considers a private ownership economy so
that consumer i’s wealth function is ri(w, p, y) = p · wi +
∑I
i=1 θijp · yj where θij ∈ R+ are
the profit shares of private firms j, j = I + 1, . . . , N , satisfying
∑I
i=1 θij = 1. In this case the
MCP equilibrium reduces to the Walrasian equilibrium for convex production sets. However,
the MCP rule in general will result in losses rather than profits. Thus, a typical wealth function
of consumer i is given by ri(w, p, y) = p ·wi+θip ·y with wi = θiw. This implies Guesnerie’s fixed
structure of revenues condition, i.e. ri(w, p, y) = θip · (w+ y), is satisfied. In this case, the lump
sum taxation to cover the losses of the firm is implicit in the formation of the budget constraint,
i.e., ri(p, y) = θip · (w + y) should be interpreted as “after-tax” income. The informational
efficiency result obtained in this paper, however, is valid for a general form of wealth map
specified below.
The i-th consumer’s wealth function is then assumed to be a function (w, p, y)→ ri(w, p, y)
on RIL+ ×RL+×RJL, which is continuous,
∑I
i=1 ri(w, p, y) =
∑I
i=1wi+
∑N
j=I+1 p·yj , ri(w, tp, y) =
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tri(wi, p, y) for all t > 0 and
∑I
i=1wi+
∑N
j=I+1 p·yj > 0 implies that ri(w, p, y) > 0. This abstract
wealth structure clearly encompasses the case of private ownership structure of ri(w, p, y) =
p ·wi+
∑n
i=1 θijp ·yj as well as the case of Guesnerie’s fixed structure of ri(w, p, y) = θip ·(w+y).
A marginal cost pricing equilibrium for a given wealth map (r1(w, p, y), . . . , rI(w, p, y)) and
for an economy e is then a list of consumption plans (x∗i ), a list of production plans (y
∗
j ), and a
price vector p∗ such that (a) every consumer maximizes his/her preferences subject to his/her
budget constraint, (b) firms’s production plans satisfy the first-order necessary conditions for
profit maximization, i.e., at the given production plans the market prices lie in the Clarke normal
cone, and (c) the excess demand over supply is zero. The main difference with the Walrasian
model is condition (b), in which firms may not maximize profits but instead behave according to
the marginal cost pricing rule. Thus, the concept of a MCP equilibrium is a natural extension
of the concept of a competitive equilibrium for economies in which some firms have non-convex
production sets. Formally, we have the following definition.
Definition 1 An allocation (x∗, y∗) = (x∗1, x∗2, . . . , x∗I , y
∗
1, y
∗
2, . . . , y
∗
J) ∈ RnL+ × Y is a marginal
cost pricing equilibrium allocation for an economy e if it is feasible and there is a price vector
p∗ ∈ RL+ such that
(1) p∗ · x∗i 5 p∗ · ri(wi, p∗, y∗) for all i = 1, . . . , I;
(2) for all i = 1, . . . , I, xi Âi x∗i implies p∗ · xi > ri(wi, p∗, y∗); and
(3) y∗j ∈ ∂Yj and p∗ ∈MCj(yj) ≡ NYj (y∗) for j = I + 1, . . . , N .
Denote byMCP (e) the set of all such marginal cost pricing equilibrium allocations andMCP(e)
the set of all such marginal cost pricing equilibria (x∗, y∗, p).
The detailed discussions on the settings of the model in economies with increasing returns
and the existence of a pricing equilibrium in general and the marginal cost pricing equilibrium
in particular can be found in Beato (1982), Brown and Heal (1982), Cornet (1988, 1989, 1990),
Bonnisseau (1988), Bonnisseau and Cornet (1988), Kamiya (1988), Vohra (1988), Brown (1991),
Quinzii (1991, 1992), and Brown, Heller, and Starr (1992).
Remark 1 The term of MCP equilibrium is, strictly speaking, inappropriate since it is not
always true that the price of a good is set at its marginal cost. p ∈ NYj implies equality between
the price of a good and its marginal cost only if the input requirement sets are convex. It has
been adopted because it is suggestive. With this qualification in mind we retain it.
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Remark 2 From the above homogeneity assumptions of ri and the strict monotonicity of pref-
erences, we may assume the equilibrium price vector p∗ belongs to the L − 1 dimensional unit
simplex ∆L−1 = {p ∈ RL++ :
∑L
i=1 p
l = 1}.
Remark 3 When all firm’s transformation functions Tj(y) are smooth, the MCP rule becomes
simpler and given by
p = γj∇Tj(yj) for some γj > 0
where ∇Tj(yj) denotes the gradient of Tj at yj
Remark 4 Also, if the production set Yj is convex, then condition (2) implies that y∗j maximizes
firm j’s profit at price p, i.e.,
(2)′ for j = I + 1, . . . , N , p∗ · y∗j = p∗ · yj for all yj ∈ ∂Yj .
2.3 Marginal Cost Pricing Quasi-Equilibrium with Transfers and the Second
Welfare Theorem
The notion of the marginal cost pricing quasi-equilibrium with transfers (MCPQT in short)
can be used to characterize Pareto efficient allocations for production economies with increasing
returns. To see this, let us first give a geometric interpretation to the two conditions for Pareto
efficiency.
Let wˆ =
∑I
i=1wi and Yˆ =
∑N
j=I+1 Yj be respectively the aggregate initial endowment and
the aggregate production set. Let
Ui(xi) = {x′i ∈ Xi : x′i <i xi} (1)
be the weak upper contour set of consumer i and let
U(x) =
I∑
i=1
Ui(xi) (2)
the aggregate weak upper contour set. The boundary of U(x) is known as a social indifference
curve or a Scitovski contour through the point xˆ =
∑I
i=1 xi.
Condition (i) for Pareto efficiency implies that
∑I
i=1 xi ∈ {wˆ} + Yˆ and hence the set U ∩
[{wˆ}+ Yˆ] contains at least ∑Ii=1 xi. Condition (ii) implies that {wˆ}+ Yˆ does not intersect the
interior of U . Hence, the sets U and {wˆ}+ Yˆ must be “tangent” at the point ∑Ii=1 xi.
When the aggregate weak upper contour set U and the aggregate production set Yˆ are both
convex (this is true if preferences <i and production sets Yj are convex) , this tangency condition
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implies the existence of a hyperplane which separates the two sets U and {wˆ}+ Yˆ. The vector
normal to this hyperplane is the vector of prices which supports the Pareto efficient allocation.
When Yˆ is non-convex, this separation property will not in general hold. However, there still
exists a hyperplane tangent to U and {wˆ}+ Yˆ and a vector p orthogonal to the two sets if the
boundaries of the two sets are smooth. Thus, in both cases, such a vector p is the supporting
prices for the Pareto efficient allocation and is called the efficient price vector in the literature.
Notice that the smoothness of U and ∂Yˆ is not needed to obtain the existence of a price
vector which supports an efficient allocation. When production sets are convex, the existence
of a supporting price vector follows from the separation theorem applied to the convex sets U
and ∂Yˆ. The same theorem also implies the existence of a cone of normals at each point of the
boundary of these sets so that one can obtain the Second Welfare Theorem that characterizes
Pareto efficient allocations by decentralized competitive markets. When production sets are
non-convex, it is also possible to generalize the Second Welfare Theorem using the MCPQT.
Definition 2 An allocation (x∗, y∗) = (x∗1, x∗2, . . . , x∗I , y
∗
1, y
∗
2, . . . , y
∗
J) ∈ RNL+ × Y is a marginal
cost pricing quasi-equilibrium allocation with transfers for an economy e if it is feasible and there
is a price vector p∗ ∈ RL+ such that
(1) for every i = 1, . . . , I, p∗ · xi = p∗ · x∗i implies xi <i x∗i , i.e., x∗i minimizes p · xi
over the weak upper contour set Ui(x∗i ) = {xi ∈ RL+ : x∗i <i x∗i },
(2) for j = 1, . . . , J , p∗ ∈ NYj (y∗).
Denote by MCPQT (e) the set of all such marginal cost pricing quasi-equilibrium allocations
with transfers.
Remark 5 It is well known that if p · x∗i > 0, then condition (1) reduces to
(1)′ for every i ∈ N , xi Âi x∗i implies p∗ · xi > p∗ · x∗i , i.e., x∗i is a greatest element
for <i in the budget set {xi ∈ RL+ : p∗ · xi 5 p∗ · x∗i }.
The resulting equilibrium that satisfies the feasibility, conditions (1)′ and (2) is then called
the marginal cost pricing equilibrium with transfers. Denote by MCPT (e) the set of all such
marginal cost pricing equilibrium allocations with transfers.
An important characterization of Pareto optimal allocations is associated with the following
version of the Second Theorem of Welfare Economics for non-convex production economies.
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Lemma 1 Suppose e is an economy such that (1) preferences <i are continuous, convex and
monotonic, (2) production sets Yj are closed and satisfy free disposal property. Let (x∗, y∗) =
(x∗1, x∗2, . . . , x∗I , y
∗
1, y
∗
2, . . . , y
∗
J) ∈ R(I+J)L+ ×Y be Pareto optimal. Then there exists a price vector
p ∈ RL+ with p ≥ 0 such that (x∗, y∗, p) is a MCPQT, and thus P (e) ⊆ MCPQT (e) for all
e ∈ E.
The proof of this lemma can be found in Cornet (1990) and Quinzii (1992).
Remark 6 Let (x, y) be a Pareto efficient allocation for a production economy e. If p is a
supporting price vector for this allocation and p ·xi > 0 for consumers i = 1, . . . , I, then (p, x, y)
is a MCP equilibrium for any wealth map (r1(w, p, y), . . . , rI(p, y)) satisfying ri(w, p, y) = p · xi
by Lemma 1 and Remark 5.
In general, a MCP equilibrium does not result in Pareto efficient allocations in the presence
of increasing returns. To have a marginal cost pricing equilibrium allocation be Pareto efficient,
one needs to restrict economic environments so that the economy has efficient allocations for
all income maps (r1(w, p, y), . . . , rI(w, p, y)). Brown and Heal (1975), Guesnerie (1980), Dierker
(1986), Cornet (1990), and Quinzii (1991, 1992) provide various conditions that guarantee the
existence of a MCP equilibrium allocation that is Pareto optimal in the presence of non-convex
production economies.
Let E∗ be the maximal class of economies over which all MCP equilibrium allocations are
Pareto efficient for a general wealth map (r1(w, p, y), . . . , rI(w, p, y)). The main purpose of
the paper is to prove the informational efficiency of the MCP mechanism among the class of
allocation mechanisms that result in Pareto efficient allocations on E∗. Notice that since every
MCP equilibrium allocation is Pareto efficient for a convex production economy, the set of convex
production economies is a subset of E∗.
To ensure a MCP equilibrium to be Pareto efficient, non-convex economies should be “well-
behaved”. This is true if there is a one to one map between the utility possibility frontier and
the feasible allocations which lead to these utilities. Guesnerie (1980) and Quinzii (1992) showed
that in a non-convex economy, if there is a unique allocation corresponding to every point on
the utility frontier, then for every income map, there exists a MCP equilibrium which is Pareto
efficient. In other words, if the choice of a production plan is unique once the social objectives
have been fixed then the choice of an income map does not affect the efficiency of the resulting
allocation. The formal result can be stated precisely as follows.
Lemma 2 Let e be a production economy satisfying the following conditions:
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(i) The utility functions ui : RL+ → R are continuous, quasi-concave, and strictly
monotonic.
(ii) The production possibility sets Yj are nonempty, closed, contain 0, and Yj−RL+ ⊆
Yj.
(iii) [wˆ + Yˆ] ∩ RL+ is compact with a non-empty interior, where wˆ =
∑I
i=1wi and
Yˆ =∑Nj=I+1 Yj.
and let P (e) be the set of Pareto efficient allocations. Suppose there is a one-to-one utility map-
ping T : P (e)→ RI , i.e., (x, y)→ (u1(x1), . . . , uI(xI)). Then for every wealth map (r1, . . . , rI),
there exists a MCP equilibrium which is Pareto efficient.
The proof of this lemma can be found in Quinzii (1992).
In Lemma 2, the assumption that the map T is one to one is not placed directly on the
characteristics of individuals and it cannot guarantee all MCP equilibria are Pareto efficient.
What restrictions must be placed on the characteristics to ensure that there is only one allo-
cation associated with a Pareto optimal utility level? We know from Lemma 1 that an alloca-
tion (x, y) is Pareto efficient if the social indifference curve associated with the levels of utility
(u1(x1), . . . , uI(xI)) is tangent to the aggregate feasible consumptions wˆ + Yˆ. Thus, there is a
unique feasible allocation which gives the Pareto optimal utility level (u1(x1), . . . , uI(xI)) if and
only if the social indifference curve corresponding to (u1(x1), . . . , uI(xI)) is tangent to wˆ+ Yˆ at
only one point. This requires restrictions on the curvature of the frontiers of the sets wˆ+ Yˆ and
P (x). Quinzii (1988, 1992) provided such conditions based on the characteristics of individuals
in terms of the elasticities of demand and of marginal cost, which ensure that the uniqueness
property of Lemma 2 is satisfied so that every MCP equilibrium allocation is Pareto efficient
(cf. Theorems 4.3 and 4.4, 4.6 and 4.7 in Quinzii (1992),).
2.4 Allocation Mechanism
Let F be a social choice rule (correspondence) from E to A. Following Mount and Reiter (1974),
a message process is a pair 〈M,µ〉, where M is a set of abstract messages called the message
space, and µ : E →→ M is a message correspondence that assigns to every economy e the set
of stationary (equilibrium) messages. An allocation mechanism (process) is a triple 〈M,µ, h〉
defined on E, where h : M → A is the outcome function that assigns to every equilibrium
message m ∈ µ(e) the corresponding trade (z, y) ∈ A.
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Definition 3 An allocation mechanism 〈M,µ, h〉, defined on E, realizes the social choice rule
F , if for all e ∈ E, µ(e) 6= ∅ and h(m) ∈ F (e) for all m ∈ µ(e).
Assume the social choice rule is restricted to the one that yields Pareto efficient outcomes.
Let P(e) be a subset of Pareto efficient allocations for e ∈ E. An allocation mechanism 〈M,µ, h〉
is said to be non-wasteful on E with respect to P if for all e ∈ E, µ(e) 6= ∅ and h(m) ∈ P(e)
for all m ∈ µ(e). If an allocation mechanism 〈M,µ, h〉 is non-wasteful on E with respect to P ,
the set of all Pareto efficient outcomes, then it is said to be non-wasteful on E. The concept of
non-wastefulness was first introduced by Hurwicz (1960).
Definition 4 An allocation mechanism 〈M,µ, h〉 is said to be privacy-preserving or informa-
tionally decentralized on E if there exist individual message correspondences µi : Ei →→ M ,
one for each i, such that µ(e) =
⋂N
i=1 µi(ei) for all e ∈ E.
Thus, when a mechanism is privacy-preserving, each individual’s response to a message is
only based on that person’s private information on his/her own characteristic, but not based
on characteristics of the other individuals. The privacy-preserving property is an important
property for a mechanism. Under any type of institution or ownership structure, only the
manager or the owner of a firm has better information about her own production set, and only
a consumer knows her own preferences and initial endowments.
Remark 7 This important feature of the communication process implies that the so called
“crossing condition” has to be satisfied. Mount and Reiter (Lemma 5, 1974) showed that an
allocation mechanism 〈M,µ, h〉 is privacy-preserving on E if and only if for every i and every e
and e′ in E, µ(e)∩µ(e′) = µ(e′i, e−i)∩µ(ei, e′−i), where (e′i, e−i) = (e1, . . . , ei−1, e′i, ei+1, . . . , eN ),
i.e., the ith element of e is replaced by e′i. Thus, if two economies have the same equilibrium
message, then any “crossed economy” in which an agent from one of the two initial economies
is “switched” with the agent from the other must have the same equilibrium message. Hence,
for a given mechanism, if two economies have the same equilibrium message m, the mechanism
leads to the same outcome for both, and further, this outcome must also be the outcome of the
mechanism for any of the crossed economies because of the crossing condition.
Definition 5 Let 〈M,µ, h〉 be an allocation mechanism on E. The stationary message cor-
respondence µ is said to be locally threaded at e ∈ E if it has a locally continuous, single-
valued selection at e. That is, there is a neighborhood N(e) ⊂ E and a continuous function
f : N(e)→M such that f(e′) ∈ µ(e′) for all e′ ∈ N(e). The stationary message correspondence
µ is said to be locally threaded on E if it is locally threaded at every e ∈ E.
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The notion of local threadedness was first introduced into the realization literature by Mount
and Reiter (1974). This regularity condition is used mainly to exclude the possibility of intuitive
smuggling information. Many continuous selection results have been given in the mathematics
literature since Micheal (1956).
It will be seen that the requirement that µ is locally threaded at every e ∈ E is not only
too strong but it also results in too pessimistic results such as those in Calsamiglia (1977)
and Hurwicz (1999) who showed the non-existence of a smooth finite-dimensional message space
mechanism that realize Pareto efficient allocations in a certain class of economies with increasing
returns and economies with production externalities that result in non-convex production sets.
2.5 The Marginal Cost Pricing Process
We now define the MCP allocation process that is a privacy-preserving process and realizes
the marginal cost pricing correspondence MCP , and in which messages consist of prices and
trades of all agents. In defining the MCP allocation process, it is assumed that the wealth map
(r1, . . . , rI) is common knowledge for all the agents.
Define the excess demand correspondence of consumer i (i = 1, . . . , I) Di : ∆L−1 × RIL+ ×
RJL × Ei →→ RL by
Di(p, w, y, ei) = {zi : zi + wi ∈ Xi, p · (zi + wi) = ri(w, p, y)
(z′i + wi) Âi (zi + wi) implies p · (z′i + wi) > ri(w, p, y)}. (3)
Define the supply correspondence of firm j (j = I + 1, . . . , N) Sj : ∆L−1 × Ej →→ RL by
Si(p, ej) = {yj ∈ ∂Yj : p ∈MCj(yj)}. (4)
Note that (p, z, y) is a MCP equilibrium for economy e with respect to a wealth distribution
map (r1, . . . , rI) if p ∈ ∆L−1, zi ∈ Di(p, w, y, ei) for i = 1, . . . , I, yj ∈ Sj(p, ej) for j = I =
1, . . . , N , and the allocation (z, y) is balanced.
The MCP process 〈Mmc, µmc, hmc〉 is then defined as follows.
Define Mmc = ∆L−1 ×A.
Define µmc : E →→Mmc by
µmc(e) = ∩Ni=1µmci(ei), (5)
where µmci : Ei →→Mmc is defined as follows:
(1) For i = 1, . . . , I, µmci(ei) = {(p, z, y, v) : p ∈ ∆L−1, zi ∈ Di(p, v, y, ei), vi = wi
and
∑I
i=1 zi =
∑N
j=I+1 yj}.
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(2) For i = I + 1, . . . , N , µmci(ei) = {(p, z, y, v) : p ∈ ∆L−1, yi ∈ Si(p, ei) and∑I
i=1 zi =
∑N
j=I+1 yj}.
Thus, we have µmc(e) =MCP(e) for all e ∈ EMC .
Finally, the MCP outcome function hmc :Mmc → A is defined by
hmc(p, z, y) = (z, y), (6)
which is an element in MCP (e).
Thus, the MCP correspondence associates with every economy e ∈ EMC the corresponding
set of MCP equilibrium allocations, while the MCP message correspondence associates with
every economy the corresponding set of MCP equilibria.
The MCP process can be viewed as a formalization of a resource allocation, which is non-
wasteful on the class of production economies E∗. The marginal cost pricing message process is
privacy-preserving by the construction of the marginal cost pricing process.
Remark 8 For a given wealth distribution map (r1, . . . , rI), since an element,m = (p, z1, . . . , zI ,
yI+1, . . . , yN , v1, . . . , vI) ∈ RL++ × RIL × RJL × RIL, of the MCP message space Mmc satisfies
the conditions
∑L
l=1 p
l = 1,
∑I
i=1 zi =
∑N
j=I+1 yj , p · (zi + wi) = ri(wi, p, p · yI+1, . . . , p · yN )
(i = 1, . . . , I), vi = wi for i = 1, . . . , I, and one of these equations is not independent by Walras
Law, any MCP message is contained within a Euclidean space of dimension (L+IL+JL+IL)−
(1 +L+ I)− IL+ 1 = (L− 1)I +LJ and thus, an upper bound on the Euclidean dimension of
Mmc is (L− 1)I + LJ , which has the same upper bound as the Walrasian process. Notice that
this upper bound holds for any marginal cost pricing equilibria under all income maps regardless
if it results in Pareto efficient allocations.
2.6 Informational Size of Message Spaces
Informational size can be considered as a concept that characterizes the relative sizes of topo-
logical spaces used to convey information in the resource allocation process. It would be natural
to consider that a space, say S, has more information than another space T whenever S is
topologically “larger” than T . This suggests the following definition, which was introduced by
Walker (1977).
Definition 6 Let S and T be two topological spaces. The space S is said to have as much
information as the space T by the Fre´chet ordering, denoted by S =F T , if T can be embedded
homeomorphically in S, i.e., if there is a subspace of S′ of S that is homeomorphic to T .
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Definition 7 Let S and T be two topological spaces and let ψ : T → S be a correspondence.
The correspondence ψ is said to be injective if ψ(t) ∩ ψ(t′) 6= ∅ implies t = t′ for any t, t′ ∈ T .
That is, the inverse, (ψ)−1, of ψ is a single-valued function.
A topological space M is an n-dimensional manifold if it is locally homeomorphic to Rn.
Definition 8 An informationally decentralized non-wasteful mechanism 〈M,µ, h〉 is said to be
informationally efficient on E if the size of its message space M is the smallest one among all
other informationally decentralized non-wasteful mechanisms defined on E.
2.7 Cobb-Douglas-Quadratic Economies
To establish the informational efficiency of the MCP mechanism, we will adopt a standard ap-
proach that is widely used in the realization literature. For a set of admissible economies and a
smooth informationally decentralized mechanism realizing a social choice correspondence, if one
can find a (parametrized) subset (test family) with dimension n, and the stationary message
correspondence is injective, then the size of the message space required for an informationally
decentralized mechanism to realize the social choice correspondence cannot be lower than n on
the subset. Thus, it cannot be lower than n for any superset of the subset, and in particular,
for the entire class of economies. It is this result that was used by Hurwicz (1977), Mount
and Reiter (1974), Walker (1977), Rsana (1978), Sato (1981), Calsamiglia and Kirman (1993),
Tian (2003, 2004, 2006) among others to show the minimal informational size and thus informa-
tional efficiency of the competitive mechanism, Lindahl mechanism, the equal-income Walrasian
mechanism, and the distributive Lindahl mechanism over the various classes of economic en-
vironments. It is also this result that was used by Calsamiglia (1977) and Hurwicz (1999) to
show the non-existence of a smooth finite-dimensional message space mechanism that realizes
Pareto efficient allocations in a certain class of economies with increasing returns and economies
with production externalities that result in non-convex production sets. It is the same result
that will be used in the present paper to establish a lower bound of the size of the message
space required for an informationally decentralized and non-wasteful smooth mechanism on the
test family that we will specify below, and consequently over the entire class of economies with
general non-convex production sets.
The test family, denoted by Ecq =
∏N
i=1E
cq
i , is a special class of economies, where preference
orderings are characterized by Cobb-Douglas utility functions, and efficient production technol-
ogy are characterized by quadratic functions. It will be showed that Ecq is a subset of E∗ in
Lemma 2.
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For i = 1, . . . , I, consumer i’s admissible economic characteristics in Ecqi are given by the set
of all ei = (Xi, wi,<i) such that Xi = RL+, wi > 0, and <i is represented by a Cobb-Douglas
utility function u(·, ai) with ai ∈ ∆L−1 such that u(zi + wi, ai) =
∏L
l=1(z
l
i + w
l
i)
ali .
For i = I +1, . . . , N , producer i’s admissible economic characteristics are given by the set of
all ei = Yi = Y(bi) such that
Y(bi) = {yi ∈ RL : b1i y1i +
L∑
l=2
(yl +
bli
2
(yl)2) 5 0
− 1
bli
5 yli 5 0 for all l 6= 1}, (7)
where bi = (b1i , . . . , b
L
i ) with b
l
i >
J
wli
. It is clear that any economy in Ecq is fully specified
by the parameters a = (a1, . . . , aI) and b = (bI+1, . . . , bN ). Furthermore, production sets are
nonempty, closed, and convex by noting that 0 ∈ Y(bj) and their efficient points are represented
by quadratic production functions in which (y2i , . . . , y
L
i ) are inputs and y
1
i is possibly an output.
Remark 9 When we defined Yi as given in (7), we have assumed that y2i , . . . , yLi are inputs.
Then, y1i may be an output (when y
1
i = 0). If we, instead, assume that 0 5 yli 5 1bli for 2, . . . , L,
and y1i is an input, all of the results given in the paper remains true. For instance, we can
similarly prove Lemma 4 on the uniqueness of the marginal coast pricing equilibrium on Ecq.
Given an initial endowment w¯ ∈ RLI++, define a subset E¯cq of Ecq by E¯cq = {e ∈ Ecd : wi =
w¯i ∀i = 1, . . . , I}. That is, endowments are constant over E¯cq.
A topology is introduced to the class E¯cq as follows. Let ‖·‖ be the usual Euclidean norm on
RL. For each consumer i, (i = 1, . . . , I), define a metric d on E¯cqi by d[u(·, ai), u(·, a¯i)] = ‖ai−a¯i‖.
Note that, since endowments are fixed over E¯cqi , this defines a topology on E¯
cq
i . Similarly, for
each producer i, (i = I + 1, . . . , N), define a metric d on E¯cqi by d[Y(bi),Y(b¯i)] = ‖bi − b¯i‖.
We may endow E¯cq with the product topology of the E¯cqi (i = 1, . . . , N) and we call this the
parameter topology, which will be denoted by Tp. Then it is clear that the topological space
(E¯cq, Tp) is homeomorphic to the (L− 1)I + LJ dimensional Euclidean space R(L−1)I+LJ .
It may be remarked that we had used the class of economies Ecq in Tian (2006) in the context
of convex economies with production over which we have studied the informational efficiency of
the competitive process.
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3 The Lower Bound of Informational Requirements of Mecha-
nisms
In this section we establish a lower bound (the minimal amount) of information, as measured by
the size of the message space, that is required to guarantee that an informationally decentralized
mechanism realizes Pareto efficient allocations on E; the class of production economies.
To make the problem nontrivial, as usual, the assumption of interiority has to be made.5
Indeed, a mechanism that gives everything to a single individual yields Pareto efficient outcomes
and no information about prices is needed. Thus, given a class of economies E that includes
Ecq, we define an optimality correspondence P : E →→ A such that the restriction P|Ecq
associates with e ∈ Ecq the set P(e) of all the Pareto efficient allocations that assign strictly
positive consumption to every consumer.
Lemma 3, which is based on the special class of Cobb-Douglas–Quadratic economies E¯cq is
central to finding the lower bound of informational requirements of resource allocation processes.
Lemma 3 Suppose 〈M,µ, h〉 is an allocation mechanism on the special class of economies E¯cq
such that:
(i) it is informationally decentralized;
(ii) it is non-wasteful with respect to P.
Then, the stationary message correspondence µ is injective on E¯cq. That is, its inverse is a
single-valued mapping on µ(E¯cq).
Theorem 1 establishes a lower bound informational size of messages spaces of any smooth
allocation mechanism that is informationally decentralized and non-wasteful over any class of
economies that includes Ecq.
Theorem 1 (Informational Boundedness Theorem) Suppose that 〈M,µ, h〉 is an allocation
mechanism on any class of production economies E that includes Ecq such that:
(i) it is informationally decentralized;
(ii) it is non-wasteful with respect to P;
(iii) M is a Hausdorff topological space;
(iv) µ is locally threaded at some point e ∈ E¯cq.
5A stronger condition that can guarantee interior outcomes is that a mechanism is individually rational.
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Then, the size of the message space M is at least as large as R(L−1)I+LJ , that is, M =F Mc =F
R(L−1)I+LJ .
Proof. As was noted above, E¯cq is homeomorphic to R(L−1)I+LJ . Hence, it suffices to show
M =F E¯cq.
By injectiveness shown in Lemma 3, we know that the restriction µ|E¯cq of the stationary
message correspondence µ to E¯cq is an injective correspondence. Since µ is locally threaded at
e ∈ E¯cq, there exists a neighborhood N(e) of e and a continuous function f : N(e) → M such
that f(e′) ∈ µ(e′) for all e′ ∈ N(e). Then f is a continuous injection from N(e) into M . Since µ
is an injective correspondence from E¯cq into M , f is a continuous one-to-one function on N(e).
Since E¯cq is homeomorphic to R(L−1)I+LJ , there exists a compact set N¯(e) ⊂ N(e) with
nonempty interior point. Also, since f is a continuous one-to-one function on N(e), f is a
continuous one-to-one function from the compact space N¯(e) onto a Hausdorff topological space
f(N¯(e)). Hence, it follows that the restriction f |N¯(e) is a homeomorphic imbedding on N¯(e)
by Theorem 5.8 in Kelley (1955, p. 141). Choose an open ball N˚(e) ⊂ N¯(e). Then N˚(e) and
f(N˚(e)) are homeomorphic by a homeomorphism f |N˚(e) : N˚(e) → f(N˚(e)). This, together
with the fact that E¯cq is homeomorphic to its open ball N˚(e), implies that E¯cq is homeomorphic
to f(N˚(e)) ⊂M . Hence, it follows that M =F E¯cd =F R(L−1)I+LJ . Q.E.D.
4 Informational Efficiency of the MCP Process
In the previous section, we found that the lower bound informational size of message spaces
for smooth allocation mechanisms that are privacy-preserving and non-wasteful over the class
E of production economies that includes E¯cq is the (L− 1)I +LJ-dimensional Euclidean space
R(L−1)I+LJ . In this section we assert that the lower bound is exactly the size of the message space
of the MCP mechanism, and thus the MCP mechanism is informationally efficient among all
smooth resource allocation mechanisms that are informationally decentralized and non-wasteful
over the set E∗.
By Theorem 1, to show this result, we need to show that Mmc is homeomorphic to the
(L − 1)I + LJ-dimensional Euclidean space R(L−1)I+LJ . To do so, note that, from Remark
2, we know that the upper bound dimension of the message space of the MCP mechanism is
(L−1)I+LJ . As a result, if we can show that this upper bound can be reached on the restriction
of the message space of the MCP mechanism for a given wealth distribution map (r1, . . . , rI) to
the test family E¯cq of Cobb-Douglas–Quadratic economies, i.e., if we can show that, for a given
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wealth map (r1, . . . , rI), µmc|E¯cq is homeomorphic to the (L− 1)I + LJ-dimensional Euclidean
space R(L−1)I+LJ , then we know that the size of the message space of the MCP mechanism
is (L − 1)I + LJ and thus the MCP mechanism is informationally efficient among all resource
allocation mechanisms that are informationally decentralized and non-wasteful over the class of
economies E∗ in which MCP equilibria result in Pareto efficient allocations. Hence, to show the
informational efficiency of the MCP mechanism, it suffices for us to show that this upper bound
can be actually reached on the test family of economies for the MCP mechanism with a given
wealth distribution map (r1, . . . , rI).
We will first state the following lemmas that shows that the MCP mechanism is single-
valued and continuous so that it is locally threaded on the test family set E¯cq of Cobb-Douglas–
Quadratic economies.
Lemma 4 For the wealth distribution map (r1, . . . , rI) with ri(w, p, y) = p · wi +
∑n
i=1 θijp · yj
for l = 1, . . . , L, every economy in E¯cq has a unique MCP equilibrium, i.e., MCP (e) is a
single-valued mapping from E¯cq to A.
Lemma 5 Let µcq be the MCP message correspondence on E¯cq. The µcq is a continuous func-
tion.
Lemma 6 µmc defined as the MCP message correspondence on E∗ is is homeomorphic to E¯cq.
From the above lemmas and Theorem 1, we have the following theorem that establishes
the informational efficiency of the MCP mechanism within the class of all smooth resource
allocation mechanisms which are informationally decentralized and non-wasteful over the class
of production economies E∗.
Theorem 2 (Informational Efficiency Theorem) The MCP allocation mechanism 〈Mmc, µmc, hmc〉
is informationally efficient among all allocation mechanisms 〈M,µ, h〉 defined on E∗ that
(i) are informationally decentralized;
(ii) are non-wasteful with respect to P;
(iii) have Hausdorff topological message spaces;
(iv) satisfy the local threadedness property at some point e ∈ E¯cq.
That is, Mmc =F R(L−1)I+LJ 5F M .
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Proof. First note that, sinceMCP (e) 6= ∅ for all e ∈ E∗, the MCP mechanism is well defined
on E∗. 〈Mmc, µmc, hmc〉 is also privacy-preserving as shown in Section 2. Since ui is strictly
monotone on E by assumption, we know z is Pareto efficient by the First Theorem of Welfare
Economics. Thus, the MCP process 〈Mmc, µmc, hmc〉 is privacy-preserving and non-wasteful
over E∗. Furthermore, by Lemmas 2 and 3, we know that µmc is a single-valued and continuous
function on E¯cq. Therefore, the MCP allocation mechanism 〈Mmc, µmc, hmc〉 satisfies Conditions
(i) - (iv).
Also, since µmc(E∗) is homeomorphic to E¯cq by Lemma 6 and E¯cq is homeomorphic to
R(L−1)I+LJ as noted above, then Mmc is homeomorphic to R(L−1)I+LJ . Thus, by Theorem 1,
we have M =F Mmc =F R(L−1)I+LJ . Hence, the MCP allocation mechanism 〈Mmc, µmc, hmc〉
is informationally efficient among all allocation mechanisms that satisfy Conditions (i) -(iv).
Q.E.D.
5 Dimension Requirement of the MCPT Process
Since a MCP equilibrium in general does not result in Pareto efficient allocations in the presence
of increasing returns, the set E∗, which is the maximal class of economies over which every MCP
equilibrium is Pareto efficient for any given wealth distribution map (r1(w, p, y), . . . , rI(w, p, y)),
is relatively restrictive. A question is then whether or not the Pareto efficient performance can
be realized by an informationally decentralized mechanism that has a finite-dimensional message
space.
There are two types of inefficiencies that may arise in a MCP equilibrium be inefficient.
The first type of inefficiency is productive inefficiency that is linked to the failure of price
to coordinate firms’ productions. One way to avoid productive inefficiency is to aggregate
individual production sets and then prove the existence of a MCP equilibrium for the aggregate
production set. The second type of inefficiency is product mix inefficiency that arises from a
lack of coordination between the consumption and the production sector and the way income is
distributed among the agents at equilibrium. Guesnerie (1975) and Brown and Heal (1979) have
constructed examples that show that all MCP equilibria are inefficient for a given income map.
Since there are income maps for which at least one MCP equilibrium is efficient, their examples
also show that in non-convex economies, efficiency of MCP equilibria and choice of income
distribution are not separate questions as they are in convex economies. In a convex Arrow-
Debreu economy, every distribution of income give rise to at least one equilibrium and every
equilibrium allocation is efficient for any given distribution of income. The only relevant criterion
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for comparing two income maps is equity since both maps give rise to efficient allocations. Thus,
in the case of convex economies, the search for efficiency through decentralized competitive
markets and the search for equity through redistributing endowments are two separate issues.
However, as shown by Brown and Heal (1979), when a production exhibits increasing returns
to scale, the situation is quite different. Although production may be efficient and prices correctly
reflect marginal costs, an equilibrium associated with a particular distribution of income may
not be Pareto optimal. In other words, the efficiency of an allocation in general depends on
the equity of an allocation. Thus, to ensure a MCP equilibrium is Pareto efficient, one should
choose a suitable wealth distribution map.
Indeed, by Lemma 1, for any economy e specified in the paper, we know that every Pareto
efficient allocation (x, y) can be supported by a MCPQT allocation. Further, by Remark 5, if p is
a supporting price vector for this allocation and p·xi > 0 (this is true as long as x 6= 0 under strict
monotonicity of preferences since p > 0 at equilibrium) for consumers i = 1, . . . , I, then (p, x, y)
is a MCPT or it is a MCP equilibrium for any wealth map (r1(w, p, y), . . . , rI(p, y)) satisfying
ri(w, p, y) = p · xi. Thus the investigation of the dimension requirement for realizing Pareto
efficient allocations over a general class of production economies with non-convex production
sets is reduced to the investigation of the dimension requirement for realizing the MCPT process
defined below.
To define the MCPT process, define consumer i’s excess demand correspondence with trans-
fers DTi : ∆L−1 × Ei →→ RL by
DTi(p, ei) = {zi : zi + wi ∈ Xi,
(z′i + wi) Âi (zi + wi) implies p · (z′i + wi) > p · (zi + wi)} (8)
for i = 1, . . . , I.
Define firm j’s supply correspondence Sj : ∆L−1 ×Ej →→ RL by
Sj(p, ej) = {yj ∈ ∂Yj : p ∈MCj(yj)} (9)
j = I + 1, . . . , N .
Then (p, z, y) is a marginal cost pricing equilibrium with transfers for economy e if p ∈ ∆L−1,
zi ∈ DTi(p, ei) for i = 1, . . . , I, yj ∈ Sj(p, ej) for j = I = 1, . . . , N , and the allocation (z, y) is
balanced.
The MCPT process 〈Mmct, µmct, hmct〉 is then defined as follows.
Define Mmct = ∆L−1 ×A.
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Define µmct : E →→Mmct by
µmct(e) = ∩Ni=1µmcti(ei), (10)
where µmcti : Ei →→Mmct is defined as follows:
(1) For i = 1, . . . , I, µmcti(ei) = {(p, z, y) : p ∈ ∆L−1, zi ∈ DTi(p, ei), and
∑I
i=1 zi =∑N
j=I+1 yj}.
(2) For i = I+1, . . . , N , µmcti(ei) = {(p, z, y) : p ∈ ∆L−1, yi ∈ Si(p, ei) and
∑I
i=1 zi =∑N
j=I+1 yj}.
Thus, we have µmct(e) =MCPT (e) for all e ∈ E. Notice that, DTi(z, y, ei) is not single-valued
because the budget is free to change, and thus µmct(e) =MCPT (e) = P (e) \ {0} by Lemma 1
and Remark 5, which cannot be singled.
Finally, the MCPT outcome function with transfers hmct :Mmct → A is defined by
hmct(p, z, y) = (z, y), (11)
which is an element in MCPT (e).
Thus, the MCPT correspondence associates with every economy e ∈ E the corresponding
set of marginal cost pricing equilibrium allocations with transfers, while the MCPT message
correspondence associates with every economy the corresponding set of marginal cost equilibria
with transfers.
The MCPT process then can be viewed as a formalization of resource allocation, which covers
the non-wasteful performance as a subprocess on the entailed class of production economies E
under consideration. The MCPT process is clearly privacy-preserving by construction.
Since an element, m = (p, z1, . . . , zI , yI+1, . . . , yN ) ∈ RL++×RIL×RJL, of the message space
for the MCPT process Mmct satisfies the conditions
∑L
l=1 p
l = 1,
∑I
i=1 zi =
∑N
j=I+1 yj , and one
of these equations is not independent by Walras Law, any MCPT message is contained within
a Euclidean space of dimension (L + IL + JL) − (1 + L) + 1 = (I + J)L and thus, an upper
bound on the Euclidean dimension of Mmct is (I + J)L, which higher than the upper bound
as the marginal cost pricing (or Walrasian) process and is increased by I. The reason that the
upper bound for the MCPT process is I-dimension higher is that each consumer minimizes his
expenditure for each given level of utility and thus is not restricted by his/her initial endowment.
Hence each consumer has one more degree of freedom in choosing his/her consumption bundle.
Thus, for any Pareto efficient allocation (x, y) (with x 6= 0) to be realized by an informationally
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decentralized mechanism, we can realize the allocation (x, y) by the MCPT mechanism. Thus,
the dimension requirement of realizing a Pareto efficient allocation is finite.
Notice that our result, which shows that it is possible to have a non-wasteful informationally
decentralized mechanism that has a finite-dimensional message space, is sharply contrast to
the result of Calsamiglia (1977), which establishes a proposition that in classes of production
economies within which at least one firm operates under unbounded increasing returns to scale, it
is impossible to have a non-wasteful informationally decentralized mechanism that has a finite-
dimensional message space. Calsamiglia first established for a class of production economies
with a single produced good, a single primary good and two firms, one of which can operate
under arbitrary increasing returns to scale. The same conclusion is then derived for a class of
economies with two desired goods, one consumer and one producer, where the producer uses one
of the goods as an input in the production of the other good under arbitrary increasing returns
to scale, while the consumer has the usual quasi-concave and strictly increasing utility function.
This impossibility theorem then obviously holds over any class of economies containing either
of the two classes of above mentioned economies.
What causes such a sharp difference? As we mentioned in Section 2, the local threadedness on
the entailed set E is probably an unduly strong requirement to impose on processes defined over
classes of economies displaying production non-convexities. Calsamiglia’s impossibility theorem
is based on the condition that the message correspondence µ is locally threaded for every economy
e ∈ E. If this requirement is dropped, then an inspection of Calsamiglis’s proofs indicates that
the argument used will no longer work. Analytical reason underlying this observation is, quite
simply, that the class of economies that Calsamigla use to obtain the impossibility theorem
satisfies the conditions of the Second Welfare Theorem given in Lemma 1. In our opinion, to
exclude the possibility of smuggling information arbitrarily, it is enough only to assume the
message correspondence is locally threaded at some point is E, but not assume that it is locally
threaded everywhere in E since the MCP process is not locally threaded for every point in E.
Thus, our possibility result is not only positive, but also more reasonable and realistic.
Indeed, Tian (2005) actually considered the incentive issue of the marginal cost pricing
equilibrium allocations with transfers by presenting a mechanism that implements marginal
cost pricing equilibrium allocations with transfers and has a finite-dimensional message space.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, it has been shown that the marginal cost pricing mechanism is informationally
the most efficient decentralized mechanism among the class of mechanisms that realize Pareto
efficient allocations over a certain class of economies with non-convex production technologies.
Since it covers convex production economies as a subset, our result includes the informational ef-
ficiency of the Walrasian process as a special case. By examining the upper bound of the message
space of the MCPT allocation mechanism, we also investigated the informational requirements
for achieving Pareto efficient allocations for the general class of non-convex production economies
and showed that Pareto efficient allocations can be realized by the MCPT mechanism that is
informationally decentralized and has a finite-dimensional message space. This result is in sharp
contrast to the impossibility result of Calsamiglia (1977), which showed that it is impossible
to have a non-wasteful informationally decentralized mechanism that has a finite-dimensional
message space for the classes of production economies within which at least one firm operates
under unbounded increasing returns to scale.
Also, like most of the realization literature, we have assumed that agents follow the rules
of the mechanism without regard to self-interest. When the incentive aspect of the Walrasian
mechanism is also taken into account, Reichelstein and Reiter (1988) have shown that a Nash
implementation typically increases the size of the message space of the mechanism. Williams
(1986) and Saijo (1988) have provided general lower bounds of the size of the message space
required to Nash implement a social choice correspondence.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose that there is a message m ∈ µ(e)∩ µ(e¯) for e, e¯ ∈ E¯cq. It will be
proved that e = e¯. Since µ is a privacy-preserving correspondence,
µ(e) ∩ µ(e¯) = µ(e¯i, e−i) ∩ µ(ei, e¯−i) (12)
for all i = 1, . . . , N by Remark 7, and hence, in particular,
m ∈ µ(e) ∩ µ(e¯i, e−i) (13)
for all i = 1, . . . , N . Let (z, y) = h(m). Since the process 〈M,µ, h〉 is non-wasteful with respect
to P, (z, y) = h(m) and (13 ) imply that (z, y) ∈ P(e) ∩ P(e¯i, e−i). Since (z, y) is an interior
point, (z, y) ∈ P(e) implies
ali(z
1
i + w¯
1
i )
a1i (z
l
i + w¯
l
i)
=
1 + bljy
l
j
b1j
l = 2, . . . , L, i = 1, . . . , I, j = I + 1, . . . , N, (14)
and
b1jy
1
j = −
L∑
l=2
(
ylj +
bjl
2
(ylj)
2
)
j = I + 1, . . . , N. (15)
Similarly, (z, y) ∈ P(e¯i, e−i) implies
a¯li(z
1
i + w¯
1
i )
a¯1i (z
l
i + w¯
l
i)
=
1 + bljy
l
j
b1j
l = 2, . . . , L, i = 1, . . . , I, j = I + 1, . . . , N. (16)
From equations (14) and (16), we derive
a¯li
a¯1i
=
ali
a1i
l = 2, . . . , L, i = 1, . . . , I. (17)
As
∑L
l=1 a
l
i = 1 and
∑L
l=1 a¯
l
i = 1, equation (17) implies
ali = a¯
l
i l = 1, . . . , L, i = 1, . . . , I, (18)
and thus a = a¯.
As for producers, (z, y) ∈ P(e¯j , e−j) implies
ali(z
1
i + w¯
1
i )
a1i (z
l
i + w¯
l
i)
=
1 + b¯ljy
l
j
b¯1j
l = 2, . . . , L, i = 1, . . . , I, j = I + 1, . . . , N, (19)
and
b¯1jy
1
j = −
L∑
l=2
(
ylj +
b¯lj
2
(ylj)
2
)
. (20)
From equations (14) and (19), we derive
b1j
b¯1j
=
1 + bljy
l
j
1 + b¯ljy
l
j
l = 2, . . . , L, j = I + 1, . . . , N. (21)
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From equations (15) and (20), we derive
b1j
b¯1j
=
∑L
l=2(1 +
blj
2 y
l
j)y
l
j∑L
l=2(1 +
b¯lj
2 y
l
j)y
l
j
j = I + 1, . . . , N. (22)
From equations (21) and (22), we have
1 + bljy
l
j∑L
l=2(1 +
blj
2 y
l
j)y
l
j
=
1 + b¯ljy
l
j∑L
l=2(1 +
b¯lj
2 y
l
j)y
l
j
l = 2, . . . , L, j = I + 1, . . . , N. (23)
Multiplying ylj on both sides of equation (23) and summing, we have∑L
l=2(1 + b
l
jy
l
j)y
l
j∑L
l=2(1 +
blj
2 y
l
j)y
l
j
=
∑L
l=2(1 + b¯
l
jy
l
j)y
l
j∑L
l=2(1 +
b¯lj
2 y
l
j)y
l
j
j = I + 1, . . . , N. (24)
Simplifying equation (24), we have
L∑
l=2
blj(y
l
j)
2 =
L∑
l=2
b¯lj(y
l
j)
2 j = I + 1, . . . , N. (25)
Multiplying 1/2 and adding
∑L
l=2 y
l
j to both sides of equation (25), and then applying equations
(15) and (20), we have
b1jy
1
j = b¯
1
jy
1
j j = I + 1, . . . , N, (26)
which implies
b1j = b¯
1
j j = I + 1, . . . , N. (27)
Finally, from equations (21) and (27), we have
blj = b¯
l
j l = 2, . . . , L, j = I + 1, . . . , N. (28)
Thus, we have proved
bj = b¯j j = I + 1, . . . , N, (29)
which means b = b¯. Thus, equations (18) and (29) mean that e = e¯. Consequently, the inverse
of the stationary message correspondence, (µ)−1, is a single-valued mapping from µ(E¯cq) to E¯cq.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4. Since a MCP equilibrium is a Walrasian equilibrium for convex
production economies, the existence of a MCP equilibrium can be obtained by applying the
existence theorem of competitive equilibrium by noting that Yi is closed and convex, 0 ∈ Yi,
(−RL+) ∈ Yi and Yi ∩ (−Yi) ⊂ {0}. To show the MCP equilibrium is unique, we first need to
derive the supply and demand functions of agents.
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Produce (for i = I + 1, . . . , N) chooses his/her production plan so as to maximize profit
within Y(bi). Thus, he/she solves the following profit maximizing problem:
max
yi
p · yi
subject to
b1i y
1
i +
L∑
l=2
(yli +
bli
2
(yli)
2) = 0 (30)
and
− 1
bli
5 yli 5 0 for all l 6= 1.
An interior solution y must satisfy the following first-order conditions:
p1 = λib1i (31)
pl = λi(1 + bliy
l
i), l = 2, . . . , L, (32)
where λi is a Lagrange multiplier. From (31) and (32) and the assumption yli 5 0, we can obtain
the supply functions
yli(p) =

b1i p
l
blip
1 − 1bli if
pl
p1
< 1
b1i
0 otherwise
(33)
for l = 2, . . . , L, and thus, by (30),
y1i (p) = −
1
b1i
L∑
l=2
[yli(p) +
bli
2
(yli(p))
2]. (34)
It may be remarked that y1i (p) = 0 for all p ∈ ∆L−1. Indeed, for l = 2, . . . , L, if p
l
p1
< 1
b1i
,
then yli(p) =
b1i p
l
blip
1 − 1bli and thus
yli(p) +
bli
2
(yli(p))
2 =
[
1 +
bli
2
yli(p)
]
yli(p)
=
[
1 +
bli
2
(
b1i p
l
blip
1
− 1
bli
)][
b1i p
l
blip
1
− 1
bli
]
=
1
2bli
(
1 +
b1i p
l
p1
)(
b1i p
l
p1
− 1
)
=
1
2bli
[(
b1i p
l
p1
)2
− 1
]
< 0. (35)
If p
l
p1
= 1
b1i
, then yli(p) = 0 by (33). Thus y
l
i(p) +
bli
2 (y
l
i(p))
2 5 0 for all p ∈ ∆L−1, and therefore
by (34), we have y1i (p) = 0 for all p ∈ ∆L−1.
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Consumer (for i = 1, . . . , I) chooses his/her consumption so as to maximize his/her utility
subject to his/her budget constraint. Since all utility functions are Cobb-Douglas, it is well
known that the net demand functions are given by
zli(p) =
ali
pli
[p · w¯i +
N∑
j=I+1
θijp · yj(p)]− w¯li. (36)
Define the aggregate net excess demand function by
zˆ =
I∑
i=1
zi(p)−
N∑
i=I+1
yi(p). (37)
Notice that, since every consumer’s budget constraint holds with equality, and the demand and
supply functions are clearly continuous, the aggregate excess demand function zˆ(p) is contin-
uous and satisfies Walras’ Law, i.e., p · zˆ(p) = 0 for all p ∈ ∆L−1. Thus, the existence of a
MCP/comeptitive equilibrium can be guaranteed by applying an existence theorem in Varian
(1992)), i.e., there exists some p ∈ ∆L−1 such that zˆ(p) 5 0, which means an equilibrium exists
for every economy e ∈ E¯cq.
Now we show that every economy e ∈ E¯cq has a unique equilibrium, and for this, it suffices
to show that all goods are gross substitutes at any price p ∈ ∆L−1, i.e., an increase in price, k,
brings about an increase in the excess demand for good l. When zˆ is differentiable, the gross
substitutes condition becomes ∂zˆ
l(p)
∂pk
> 0 for l 6= k.
For each i = I + 1, . . . , N , from (33), if p
l
p1
< 1
b1i
we have
∂yli(p)
∂pl
=
b1i
blip
1
> 0 l = 2, . . . , L, (38)
∂yli(p)
∂pk
= 0 k 6= l, k 6= 1, l 6= 1, (39)
∂yli(p)
∂p1
= − b
1
i p
l
bli(p1)2
< 0 l = 2, . . . , L, (40)
and from (34), we have
∂y1i (p)
∂p1
= − 1
b1i
L∑
l=2
[1 + bliy
l
i]
∂yli
∂p1
> 0, (41)
and
∂y1i (p)
∂pl
= − 1
b1i
[1 + bliy
l
i]
∂yli
∂pl
< 0. (42)
When p
l
p1
= 1
b1i
, yli(p) are constant functions for l = 2, . . . , L. Thus, y
l
i(p) is a nonincreasing
function in pk for any l 6= k and any p ∈ ∆L−1.
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Note that, by Hotelling’s Lemma (cf. Varian (1992, p. 43), ∂p·yj(p)
∂pk
= ykj (p), and − 1bki > −
w¯ki
J
by the assumption that bki >
J
w¯ki
. Then, for each i = 1, . . . , I, from (36), we have
∂zli(p)
∂pk
=
ali
pl
w¯ki + N∑
j=I+1
θijy
k
j (p)

= a
l
i
pl
w¯ki + N∑
j=I+1
θij
(
− 1
bki
)
>
ali
pl
w¯ki + N∑
j=I+1
(
− w¯
k
i
J
) = 0 (43)
for l 6= k, k 6= 1, and
∂zli(p)
∂p1
=
ali
pl
w¯1i + N∑
j=I+1
θijy
1
j (p)
 > 0 (44)
by noting that y1j (p) = 0. Thus, the net demand function zli(p) is an increasing function and the
supply function yli(p) is a non-increasing function in price k 6= l for every p ∈ ∆L−1. Therefore,
an increase in price, k, brings about an increase in the excess demand for good l, and thus all
goods are gross substitutes. Hence, the equilibrium must be unique (cf. Varian (1992)). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5. By Lemma 4, we know µcq = (p, z, y) is a (single-valued) function.
Also, from (33), (34) and (36), we know that the demand function z(p; c) and supply function
y(p; c) are continuous in p and c := (a, b). So we only need to show the price vector p is a
continuous function on E¯cq.
Let {e(k)} be a sequence in E¯cq and e(k) → e ∈ E¯cq. Since any economy in E¯cq is fully
specified by the parameter vector c, e(k)→ e implies c(k)→ c.
Let µcq = (p, z(p; c), y(p; c)) and µcq(k) = (p(k), z(p(k); c(k)), y(p(k); c(k))). Then we have,
zˆ(p; c) = 0 and zˆ(p(k); c(k)) = 0, i.e.,
I∑
i=1
zi(p; c) =
N∑
j=I+1
yj(p; c)
and
I∑
i=1
zi(p(k); c(k)) =
N∑
j=I+1
yj(p(k); c(k)).
Since the sequence {p(k)} is contained in the compact set ∆¯L−1 = {p ∈ RL+ :
∑L
l=1 p
l = 1},
there exists a subsequence {p(kt)} that converges, say, p¯ ∈ ∆¯L−1 and zˆ(p(kt); c(kt)) = 0. Since
zi(p(k); c(k)) and zi(p(k); c(k)) are continuous in c, zˆ(p; c) is continuous in c and thus we have
zˆ(p(kt); c(kt))→ zˆ(p¯, c) as kt →∞ and c(kt)→ c. However, since every e ∈ E¯cq has the unique
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MCP equilibrium price p that is completely determined by zˆ(p; c) = 0, we must have p¯ = p.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 6. By Lemma 4, we know that µcq is the restriction of µmc to E¯cq. We
first prove that the inverse of µcq, (µcq)−1 is a function.
Let m ∈ µcq(E¯cq) and let e, e′ ∈ (µcq)−1(m). Then m ∈ µcq(e) ∩ µcq(e′) = µmc(e) ∩ µc(e′) =
µmc(e′i, e−i) ∩ µmc(ei, e′−i) for all i = 1, . . . , N by Remark 7. Let (z, y) = hcd ∈ W (E¯cq) be
the MCP outcome function. Since ui is monotonically increasing, we know (z, y) is Pareto
efficient by the First Theorem of Welfare Economics. Then, the allocation process 〈Mc, µcq, hcq〉
is privacy-preserving and non-wasteful over E¯cq with respect to P. By Lemma 3, e = e′ and
thus (µcq)−1 is a function. Also, by Lemma 5, µcq is a continuous function. Therefore, µcq is a
continuous one-to-one function on E¯cq.
Since every e is fully characterized by (a, b) ∈ RLI+LJ++ with
∑L
l=1 a
l
i = 1 for i = 1, . . . , I,
E¯cq is homeomorphic to the finite-dimensional Euclidean space R(L−1)I+LJ . Thus, it must
be homeomorphic to any open ball centered on any of its points, and locally compact. It
follows that for any e ∈ E¯cq, we can find a neighborhood N(e) of e and a compact set N¯(e) ⊂
N(e) with a nonempty interior point. Since µcd is a continuous one-to-one function on N(e),
µcd is a continuous one-to-one function from the compact space N¯(e) onto an Euclidean (and
hence Hausdorff topological) space µcd(N¯(e)). It follows that the restriction of µcd to N(e)
is a homeomorphic imbedding on N¯(e) by Theorem 5.8 in Kelley (1955, p. 141). Choose an
open ball N˚(e) ⊂ N¯(e). Then N˚(e) and µcd(N˚(e)) are homeomorphic by a homeomorphism
µcd|N˚(e) : N˚(e) → µcd(N˚(e)). This, together with the fact that E¯cq is homeomorphic to its
open ball N˚(e), implies that E¯cq is homeomorphic to µcd(N˚(e)) ⊂Mmc, implying that µcd(Ec)
can be homeomorphically imbedded in µmc(E∗).
Finally, by Remark 2, the MCP message spaceMmc is contained within an Euclidean space of
dimension (L−1)I+LJ . This necessarily implies thatMmc and thus µmc(E¯cq) is homeomorphic
to R(L−1)I+LJ because his restriction µcq(E¯cq) is homeomorphic to R(L−1)I+LJ , and consequently,
µc(Ec) is homeomorphic to E¯cq. Q.E.D.
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